[Joseph J. Kilgarriff] was KIA at Anzio May 26, 1944 can you describe the situation?
Hey Bill,
I have been going through my inbox and finding submitted questions that were difficult to find answers for recently. I had quite a few to sort through that mostly involved questions that were better directed towards the VA.
Unfortunately, in your original submission you did not provide a return email address and perhaps were expecting a faster response which didn’t come until now.
In any case, I’ll try my best to provide an answer and although I did not find any military records for Joseph J. Kilgarriff specifically, what I did find about Anzio was pretty detailed and provides aspects of what occurred there from two different perspectives within the Army.
Finding My Biggest Lead
Originally, I researched some of the history of Anzio which gave me generalized results about the battles and significance of the area but then it dawned on me to Kilgarriff + Anzio WW2 and that’s when I stumbled upon a Twitter account which helped point me in the right direction.
I’m guessing that perhaps you had reached out to several organizations looking for answers and that Bill Beigel was one of those people. If not, his timing for posting this is very serendipitous as he has a tweet from a few months after I received your email concerning your father.
Anyway, it got me thinking and now I had a first name to work with and while I didn’t find any specific information that was better than this about Joseph J. Kilgarriff I stumbled upon something that will help paint a picture of what happened during the Anzio conflict on May 26th and also the responsibilities of the Quartermasters in that area, at that time.
State of the WW2 Quartermasters
First, you might wonder, what is a Quartermaster in the Army? According to a basic job description on indeed.com Army quartermasters are responsible for:
Supervising supply warehouses and keeping inventory records
Facilitating the delivery and transportation of supplies to Army bases
Examining inventory for damages or missing items
Ensuring all equipment and tools are functional and accessible
Providing instruction and advisement to personnel on using equipment and supplies
PV2 Kilgarriff’s main duties may have been doing inventory checks, distribution of supplies, checking equipment, and in Anzio while attached to the 3rd ID he would play a part in distributing rations and other vital inventory. It’s hard to know for sure though as the Quartermaster is actually a huge logistical department of the Army and has many functions.
Also, WW2 was a different era that demanded more from all soldiers. The Quartermaster Museum in Fort Lee, Virginia has a historical post from May-June 1946 of the Quartermaster Review online which describes the history and functions of the Quartermasters in that era.
Of particular interest is this paragraph which reports not on the duties but reflects more of the general climate for soldiers in the Army’s quartermasters during WW2:
German victories in the late spring and early summer of 1940 brought forth startling directives from the War Department. On the 15th of June The Adjutant General directed the establishment of new courses at The Quartermaster School to meet the needs of training. The first of a series of special courses for officers and the first of a series of special courses for enlisted men were begun in July 1940. The officers’ course covered the entire field of quartermaster functions. The courses for enlisted men gave training in the duties of first sergeants, sergeant majors, and company clerks; regiment, battalion, and company sergeants; and railhead transportation clerks. In August the Extension Department entered upon an expanded program of manual and scenario writing for the purpose of implementing training throughout the Quartermaster Corps.
The Quartermaster Review
It looks like the “War Department” believed there was a need for every soldier who entered the service to be capable of immediately replacing any superior role in their Division at a moment’s notice.
As an addendum to the duties and responsibilities of a quartermaster in WW2, I found this excerpt on an Alabama based website Landmarks of Alabama from their book “A History of World War II Veterans” about quartermaster soldier Arice Raymond Newsome. This is not an ad but you can purchase the book from their website…although their “Buy Now” link goes straight to a PayPal page, (I think they just need a better web developer).
One might think that a quartermaster soldier would have it easy, away from the war zone. He probably wouldn’t have to dig foxholes, see combat, or smell gunpowder. Almost everything that a soldier wore, carried, or ate on the battle front, was supplied by the Quartermaster Corps. Newsome and his quartermaster unit landed on the beaches of Normandy on June 10, 1944, D-Day plus four. They hit the beaches to unload rations, ammunition, and all types of equipment and supplies. These soldiers opened and ran dumps under combat conditions, used their helmets to wash and shave, and at times took up bazookas, machine guns, and rifles.
The quartermaster units performed every type of truck support for the fighting troops. Supplies were taken up into the front lines and unloaded directly. Most missions were completed under shell-fire and strafing. The trucks were sent out with infantrymen aboard on spearhead thrusts, and when resistance was encountered, the truck drivers often found themselves taking part in the fighting. In emergencies they manned machine guns, carried barbed wire and mines into positions forward, and shared the same rigors and dangers as did the divisional troops.
May of 1944 was the tail end of a long winter for US soldiers on the front lines in WWII. And, from historical records, one of the major problems the Quartermasters faced were keeping soldiers warm, dry, and safe from developing trench foot at least.
Recognizing the need for new equipment Anzio became the frontline testing ground for “New Special Items”.
The following excerpt is from “The Quartermaster Corps”. I’ve done my best to only include information that helps paint a picture of what one of the major operations of the quartermasters were in Anzio. While someone at the rank of PV2 would not be making decisions of what, where, and how to test experimental equipment, he would be involved in the actual testing and/or distribution. With these experimental items being the focus of his chain of command he would definitely be aware of and most likely assisting for his part.
The following testing at Anzio happened shortly before “The Breakthrough” of operation Buffalo beginning on 23 May 1994 and would be crucial in updating the Army uniform in cold damp climates.
But first let’s look at the big picture operation of the QM in Anzio.
…[Office of the Quartermaster General] OQMG observers brought about thirty different Quartermaster Class II and IV experimental items to the Anzio beachhead at the end of March 1944…for issue to troops in cold-temperate, low mountain, or alpine areas, and had received War Department sanction to be combat tested. In light of the difficulties during the first winter in Italy and the prospect that Fifth Army might spend another winter there, the scope of the tests at Anzio took on special significance for NATOUSA quartermasters.
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Until they had been seen and studied by supply officers at the grass roots level, a theater quartermaster could only offer a rough guess at what his requirements for a new item might be.
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In all tests, it proved wise for both user and supplier to see the results personally rather than merely read a series of disconnected command reports based on the findings of a series of observers. For tactical commanders, whose main interest is always in the quantity of items, the lesson is equally simple—sound and prompt command decisions must speedily be channeled to support commands.
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Sent to Italy to supervise the tests were two officers from the Research and Development Branch, OQMG, who had come via slow convoy to assure that the experimental items were not diverted en route. Each officer had a letter of introduction, dated 28 February 1944, from Col. Georges F. Doriot, chief of the Military Planning Division, and also chief of the Research and Development Branch. Maj. Robert H. Bates, an experienced mountain climber and adviser to OQMG on cold weather clothing, and 1st Lt. Michael Slauta, a qualified parachutist with a knowledge of infantry platoon tactics, proceeded to Anzio on War Department orders.
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On 28 March 1944 the items to be tested reached the 3d Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. John W. O’Daniel commanding.
O’Daniel ordered Lt. Col. Woodrow W. Stromberg, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, to distribute them among 932 men of his command. He also directed his own divisional reconnaissance platoon and the comparable platoons of his three regiments, the 7th, 15th, and 30th Infantry, together totaling 215 men, to test the equipment. Shoelaces and ski socks were to be tested by a hundred men of the division’s military police, and wool comforters by 43 men of the division’s quartermaster company. Nine men of the 191st Tank Battalion, attached to 3d Division, were to test the suitability of all the items for armored force use.
The Anzio beachhead, 100 square miles between the German lines and the Tyrrhenian Sea, was the test area. Its terrain was low, wet, and muddy, and it was cut by many small streams. Large sandy areas met the sea. No hilly ground was available, but battle action and barbed wire entanglements, in the opinion of tacticians, provided a better test of the durability of the experimental items than rugged physical features. The weather was not cold, temperatures varying from 37° to 70° Fahrenheit. Winds averaged 5 to 8 miles per hour with occasional gusts up to 20 miles per hour. Showers fell on an average of one every third day, and heavy rains occurred on two days of the testing period. Despite the high average daytime temperature, excessive dampness made for chilly nights.
As for the tactical aspects of the test, it took place during a period of near stalemate. Neither side started any attacks involving many men or much armor. During the first fortnight participating units were five miles behind the front, undergoing rigorous field training. Five-mile, speed-conditioning marches, tactical exercises in scouting and patrolling, attacks against mock enemy positions, weapons training, and movement through barbed wire entanglements, all subjected clothing and equipment to stress and strain which commanders felt were comparable to those on the firing line.
The last half of the test brought the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, with supporting units, back to the front. During daylight hours, the lines were quiet and troops remained in their foxholes or underground shelters. At night, reconnaissance and combat patrols moved actively between the lines.
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After the test Stromberg’s battalion rated the M1943 jacket an improvement over the 1941 Parsons jacket in appearance, camouflage, and utility. Stromberg and O’Daniel both approved of the experimental uniform, writing that “the discovery that men could fight out of their jacket and trouser pockets” was the most important feature of the test. As a special modification of the M1943 jacket, Stromberg designed a rear pocket capable of carrying a day’s K or C ration, plus a poncho or blanket sleeping bag.
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The success of the Anzio test, from the Quartermaster Corps point of view, was implicit in General O’Daniel’s recommendation on 9 May 1944 that twenty-four of the thirty-one experimental items should be made authorized articles of issue by the theater commander.
I just think that’s a really cool piece of history and I hope you enjoyed learning more about one of the Army wide effects your father participated in.
23 May – 4 June 1944: The Breakthrough
The situation in Anzio was from military resources fairly mild compared to other regions of conflict. As exhibited previously they had time to test equipment and improve their position tremendously as things were considered to be in somewhat of a stalemate for several months.
It wasn’t until 23 May 1944 that the joint US and British forces implemented plan BUFFALO. This would bring about the Breakthrough of enemy lines and the advance of US forces into Italy.
If you would like to read more about Anzio I would highly recommend visiting https://history.army.mil/html/books/100/100-10/CMH_Pub_100-10.pdf. The following is only a small excerpt of the battle starting on Page 119. Since Joseph J. Kilgarriff was in the 3d Infantry Division Quartermaster I have highlighted their movement on the maps and bolded sections which mentions them directly.
At 0545 on 23 May, a tremendous Allied artillery barrage was directed against the enemy defenses along the Cisterna front. Forty-five minutes later, American tanks and infantry emerged from the smoke all along the front from Carano to the Mussolini Canal to launch the assault. At first, the enemy resistance was stiff, and German mine fields took a heavy toll of American tanks and tank destroyers; but before noon, the 1st Special Service Force had cut Highway No.7 below Cisterna, and all units had reached their initial objectives.
Bad weather curtailed the planned air support, but before the day was over 722 missions had been flown; Cisterna and more distant objectives were heavily bombed. By evening, the 1st Armored Division had crossed the Cisterna-Campoleone railroad, and had smashed the enemy main line of resistance. The enemy estimated that, by the end of the first day’s attack, the 362d Infantry Division had lost 50 percent of its fighting power, and two regiments of the 715th Infantry Division had been badly mauled.
The Hermann Goering Panzer Division was rushed southward from Leghorn; and Fourteenth Army planned to detach combat units from I Parachute Corps, holding the Moletta River-AIbano road sector, to bolster the shattered forces of LXXVI Panzer Corps on the Cisterna front. This step was frustrated by the holding attacks of the British 1 and 5 Divisions and the attack on the left flank by the 45th Division. [German Commander] General Mackensen realized his precarious position, but his request to withdraw his left flank to the base of the Lepini Mountains was refused.
Resuming the attack on 24 May, VI Corps troops drove forward beyond the railroad to cut Highway No.7 above Cisterna, and virtually to encircle Cisterna itself. On 25 May the German defenses to the rear of Cisterna crumbled, and Cisterna itself fell to the troops of the 3d Division, who collected nearly a thousand enemy prisoners. By nightfall, 3d Division and 1st Special Service Force units were at the base of the Lepini Mountains, before Cori; meanwhile, 1st Armored Division troops had reached a position halfway between Cori and Velletri, thus facing the entrance of the Velletri Gap leading toward Valmontone.
Map of Troop Movements During Breakthrough Advance
On 26 May, the 1st Armored Division advanced to within two miles of Velletri; while the 3d Division raced through the Velletri Gap its reconnaissance units reached the outskirts of Artena, only three miles from the goal of Valmontone and Highway No.6. Although Artena was captured on the following day, the VI Corps advance then came to a temporary halt. The plans for the continuation of the Fifth Army’s attack were being recast, and the enemy had now somewhat recovered from his confusion. In particular, elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division had reached the Valmontone area and were counterattacking the 3d Division.
VI Corps’ highly successful offensive out of the Anzio beachhead was nevertheless costly in losses, both in men and material. In the first five days of the attack, combat casualties exceeded 4,000; they were almost twice as heavy in killed and wounded as during the five days of the big German attack of 16-20 February. The 1st Armored Division and other armored units supporting the infantry lost at least eighty-six tanks and tank destroyers in the first day’s attack alone.
Enemy losses were far heavier; no figures are available for the number of enemy troops that were killed and wounded, but in the first five days of the attack VI Corps captured 4,838 prisoners and, among items of enemy material, destroyed or damaged more than 2,700 motor transperts.
On 26 May General Clark issued new orders to VI Corps which reshaped the nature and direction of its attack. Hitherto, the main axis of advance had been toward Valmontone; now, the weight of the VI Corps drive was to be shifted to the west of Colli Laziali, to seize a line from the Factory through Campeleone to Lanuvio.
Map of Troop Movements Highlighting Operational Focus Shift
The 34th Division would advance northwest from below Velletri (which was stubbornly defended by the enemy) toward Lanuvio, while the 45th Division attacked toward Campeleone Station. Initially, the 1st Armored Division was allotted the task of attacking Velletri; subsequently (28 May) it was shifted to the left Rank to strengthen the attack of the 45th Division.
In the Artena area, the 3d Division was to continue its advance on Valmontone, while the wide gap between the attacks to the west and east of Colli Laziali was to be plugged by the 36th Division. This general plan was carried out in the face of stiffening enemy resistance…In the east, the 3d Division was held on the defensive by the counterattacking Hermann Goering Panzer Division.
On 30 May the 3d Division and 1st Special Service Force passed to the control of II Corps, which thereafter commanded the attack toward Valmontone and Highway No.6.
It is somewhere in the midst of advancing to Artena into the defense of the German Panzer Divisions on the 26th of May 1944 that Joseph J. Kilgarriff was Killed In Action alongside Joseph Guardabascio both soldiers from 3rd Quartermaster Company, 3rd Infantry Division.
